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COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPOSITS AND
COLLECTIONS
Ronald L. Hersbergen*
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMMERCIAL LAWS AND THE
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
During the eighty years in which the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law (NIL) was applicable to negotiable instru-
ments in Louisiana, Revised Statutes 7:195 permitted the law
merchant' to govern "any case not provided for" in the NIL.
Section 195, which was not often utilized,2 does not reappear
in Chapter 3 of the Commercial Laws;' instead, section 1-103
simply says that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provi-
sions of this title, the other laws Of Louisiana shall apply."4 In
many instances, the Commercial Laws' provisions explicitly do
not displace the other laws of Louisiana; thus, when the party
who has signed a negotiable instrument claims that he lacked
capacity at the time of signing, section 3-305(2)(b) permits that
fact to be asserted defensively against a holder in due course
Faculty Member, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 7:915 (1950), repeated by 1974 La. Acts, No. 92, provides: "In any
case not provided for in this chapter the rules of the law merchant shall govern." Law
merchant means, essentially, the customs and usages of business. See, e.g., White v.
Jones, 14 La. Ann. 681 (1859) (recognizing a then-existing mercantile custom between
planters and factors).
2. The NIL itself was an attempt to codify the law merchant. See Marinoni v.
Levy, 9 Orl. App. 253 (1912). In J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Bridger, 133 La.
754, 63 So. 319 (1913), the court, finding no explanation of the language in section 119
of the NIL, which read, in part, "the act which will discharge a simple contract for
the payment of money," held, through resort to the law merchant, that the provisions
of the Louisiana Civil Code applied on the issue of discharge of one solidary obligor as
discharging all.
3. LA. R.S. 10:1-101 through 8-501 (Supp. 1974 & 1978). Section 1-101 provides
that title 10 of the Revised Statutes shall be known as the "Commercial Laws." These
provisions represent the enactment of articles 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (U.C.C.), with minor revisions where necessary to conform with the general
scheme of Louisiana law. Hereinafter, any reference to the U.C.C., where different
from Louisiana law, will be noted. Otherwise, any reference to "Commercial Laws" will
be to title 10.
4. LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (Supp. 1974). The section adopts the sense, but not the text,
of U.C.C. § 1-103.
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only if "such . . .incapacity . .. renders the obligation an
absolute nullity." 5 As demonstrated in First National Bank of
Shreveport v. Williams,' the answer to the "absolute nullity"
language of section 3-305 is found in Civil Code articles 1788
and 1789. Other sections of the Commercial Laws also rely on
the "other laws of Louisiana," including sections 3-207 and 3-
123(b); the references in section 3-305(2) to minority, duress,
and illegality; various references in the statute to negligence,,
agreement,' claims,' or contract defenses;10 and numerous defi-
nitions."
In several instances, however, the Commercial Laws' par-
ticular provisions obviously do displace any inconsistent provi-
sions found elsewhere in the laws of Louisiana. For example,
the issues of negotiable form," acquisition of and rights at-
tendant to holder in due course status, 3 liability of signatories
and transferors," and the liability of those who pay an instru-
ment on a forged indorsement 5 are displaced by the provisions
of the Commercial Laws pertaining thereto. In still other situa-
tions, the silence of the Commercial Laws triggers section 1-
103; included in this category are the effect on the underlying
obligation of the giving of a negotiable instrument" and the
matter of lost instruments. 7 .
The recent decision of the First Circuit in Houston v.
McCoy" portends judicial difficulty with the meaning of sec-
5. LA. R.S. 10:3-305(2)(b) (Supp. 1974).
6. 346 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
7. LA. R.S. 10:3-406, 10:4-406 (Supp. 1974). See also St. James Bank & Trust
Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 354 So. 2d 233 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
8. LA. R.S. 10:1-102(3), 10:4-103(1) (Supp. 1974).
9. LA. R.S. 10:3-305(1), 10:3-306(a) (Supp. 1974).
10. LA. R.S. 10:3-601(2) (Supp. 1974).
11. LA. R.S. 10:1-201, 10:3-102, 10:4-104, 10:4-105 (Supp. 1974).
12. LA. R.S. 10:3-104-19 (Supp. 1974).
13. LA. R.S. 10:3-302, 10:3-305 (Supp. 1974).
14. LA. R.S. 10:3-401-06, 3-410-16 (Supp. 1974) (signatories); LA. R.S. 10:3-
417(2) (Supp. 1974) (transferors).
15. LA. R.S. 10:3-419(1) (Supp. 1974).
16. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-802 (1972 revision) (not adopted in Louisiana); Housing Auth.
of Lake Charles v. Minor, 355 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), discussed in text
accompanying notes 35-44, infra.
17. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-804 (1972 revision) (not adopted in Louisiana).
18. 351 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
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tion 1-103, for the decision, if correct as a matter of the NIL,"
would certainly be incorrect under the Commercial Laws. The
facts were these: a bearer note"° was acquired by Myrtle Hous-
ton from James McCoy in part payment of the sale price of
certain of Mrs. Houston's separate properties. Six months prior
to her death, Mrs. Houston made a manual donation of the
note to William Houston, her husband. Mrs. Houston died
intestate and, because no authentic act attended the donation,
a claim of ownership was created in favor of some of Mrs.
Houston's relatives. McCoy subsequently refused to pay the
note; Mr. Houston sued him, only to lose the case upon the
lower court's ruling that the delivery of the note to Mr. Houston
had not been a "negotiation" and therefore had not bestowed
title or holder status upon him-in short, that the transfer was
a nullity. The decision was affirmed by the First Circuit Court
of Appeal.
Although the ultimate outcome would not change, there is
reason to believe that the decision is incorrect as a matter of
the NIL2 as well as an incorrect application of the Commercial
Laws in force today. When Mrs. Houston voluntarily delivered
a bearer note to Mr. Houston, a "negotiation" took place
within the meaning of section 3-202, i.e., it was a "transfer...
in such form that the transferee becomes a holder," because
section 3-202's sole requirement for a negotiation of bearer
paper is delivery.12 It matters not that for other purposes an
authentic act was required; what constitutes a valid
"negotiation" is a matter clearly displaced by the specific pro-
visions of section 3 -202.2 Thus, when Mr. Houston presented
the note to McCoy (who presumably knew at that time of the
19. The case arose prior to January 1, 1975, the effective date of title 10.
20. The note was issued by James McCoy, payable to the order of "myself" and
indorsed in blank. See First Nat'l Bank of Lafayette v. Gaddis, 250 So. 2d 504 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1971).
21. See Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Sacks, 92 So. 747 (La. 1922), holding
that the matter of indorsement without recourse was a "case provided for" by the NIL,
and, accordingly, the law merchant was not applicable.
22. Defined in § 1-201 as a "voluntary transfer of possession. . . from one person
to another." LA. R.S. 10:1-201 (Supp. 1974).
23. The same result arguably obtained under NIL § 30, upon which section
U.C.C. § 3-202 is based. See also J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Bridger, 63 So.
319 (La. 1913).
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claim of Mrs. Houston's heirs), current law would not allow
McCoy to defend his non-payment on the basis of such a claim,
unless the heirs themselves defended the action for him.24 In
fact, McCoy under the present laws could proceed to pay Mr.
Houston and obtain a discharge of his obligation, in spite of
knowledge of the claim of the heirs, unless prior to such pay-
ment the claimants had either supplied indemnity deemed
adequate by McCoy or enjoined payment by an order of a court
in an action in which the claimants and Mr. Houston were
parties.n
The decision in Houston v. McCoy is not itself dramatic,
since Mr. Houston, apparently not a holder in due course, 21 is
quite likely to lose to the heirs in the final analysis.27 But to
deny a good faith transferee title and holder status to a bearer
note voluntarily delivered to him, on the basis of invalid nego-
tiation, is to blithely undo a commercial principle extant for
two hundred and twenty years-namely, the doctrine of Miller
v. Race,28 the very foundation of negotiable instruments law.
Similar trauma to the concept of negotiability was avoided
24. See LA. R.S. 10:3-306(d) (Supp. 1974). A maker could, however, personally
raise against a non-holder in due course the defense of "acquisition by theft," without
the third-party's intervention.
25. See LA. R.S. 10:3-603(1) (Supp. 1974). The only situations in which a maker
may not proceed to pay the party in possession of the instrument and thereby obtain
a discharge are when: (a) the possessor is not the holder due to a prior forged indorse-
ment; (b) the maker pays the possessor in bad faith because of his knowledge that the
possessor acquired the bearer paper by theft; or (c) the maker pays the possessor
despite the indemnity supplied by the claimant, or despite a court order enjoining
payment.
The donation presently could be considered "rescindable" by the heirs under LA.
R.S. 10:3-207 (Supp. 1974), but that section and its U.C.C. commentary still deem the
transfer a negotiation and the transferee a holder until such time as the transfer is
judicially undone.
26. See LA. R.S. 10:3-302(1)(a), 10:3-303 (Supp. 1974). Section 3-201 presumably
does not aid Mr. Houston unless Mrs. Houston was herself a holder in due course.
27. Section 3-306 recites that "[u]nless he has the rights of a holder in due
course any person takes the instrument subject to (a) all valid claims to it on the part
of any person . ... "
28. 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758). In Miller, Finney, possessor of a
Bank of England note payable to bearer, on demand, sent it by mail to Odenharty.
The mail was robbed and the bearer note ultimately came into the possession of an
innkeeper named Miller, a good faith taker for valuable consideration. Finney, realiz-
ing that the note had been lost, requested that the Bank of England refuse or "stop"
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by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in St. James Bank and
Trust Co. v. Board of Commissioners, Ponchartrain Levee
District."' The Board had issued a warrant" directed to the
State Comptroller and payable to a construction company, but
prior to receipt thereof by the Comptroller, the Board had or-
dered payment stopped. The plaintiff-bank, which had ad-
vanced funds against the warrant, sued the Board, claiming
holder in due course status.3 Finding that the warrant was in
negotiable form32 under sections 3-104 and 3-105(1)(g), the
payment on the note. When Miller presented the note to the bank for payment, Race,
the bank's clerk, refused to either pay or return the note. By ruling in favor of Miller,
Lord Mansfield created the concept of a protected third party taker, or, holder in due
course, by equating the bearer note with money:
Tis pity that reporters sometimes catch at quaint expressions that may
happen to be dropped at the Bar or Bench; and mistake their meaning. It has
been quaintly said, "that the reason why money cannot be followed is, because
it has no ear-mark:" but this is not true. The true reason is, upon account of
the currency of it: it cannot be recovered after it has passed in currency. So, in
case of money stolen, the true owner cannot recover it, after it has been paid
away fairly and hopestly upon a valuable and bona fide consideration: but
before money has passed in currency, an action may be brought for the money
itself ....
Apply this to the case of a bank-note. An action may lie against the finder,
it is true; (and it is not all denied:) but not after it has been paid away in
currency.
29. 354 So. 2d 233 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
30. Historically, warrants have not been deemed negotiable. See, e.g., Boxwell
v. Dep't of Highways, 203 La. 760, 14 So. 2d 627 (La. 1943); Logan County Bank v.
Farmers' Nat'l Bank, 155 Pac. 561 (Okla. 1916); Adams v. McGill, 146 S.W.2d 332
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940). The court held the warrant in the principal case to be negotiable
under LA. R.S. 10:3-104, 10:3-105(1)(g) (Supp. 1974). See note 32, infra. That being
so, it technically must be referred to as a "draft" under LA. R.S. 10:3-104(2) (Supp.
1974), the label "warrant" being a colloquialism or customary term. Warrants for
corporate stock are "investment securities" within the meaning of LA. R.S. 10:8-102
(Supp. 1978). See E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 259 F.
Supp. 513 (E.D. Mich. 1966). Instruments within the newly-enacted Chapter 8 of the
Commercial Laws are not subject to the provisions of Chapter 3 thereof. 1978 La. Acts,
No. 165. See LA. R.S. 10:3-103(1) (Supp. 1974).
31. The plaintiff-bank was probably a depositary-collecting bank under LA. R.S.
10:4-105(a), (d) (Supp. 1974) which gave value and had possession of the instrument
after dishonor. See LA. R.S. 10:4-208(1)(c), 10:4-209, 10:3-302 (Supp. 1974).
32. Warrants are typically drawn against what the NIL and law merchant con-
sidered a "particular fund" and were for that reason generally classified as non-
negotiable. See note 30, supra. Under the Commercial Laws, as pointed out by the
court, such instruments are negotiable under LA. R.S. 10:3-104, 11:3-105(1)(g) (Supp.
1974). See also United States v. Swan's Estate, 441 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's judgment for the
bank. The Board asserted that funds should not have been
advanced by a bank against a "collection" item,33 but the
court, while agreeing that such a practice is not to be recom-
mended," found no distinction in the statute between
"collection" items and "payment" items as negotiable instru-
ments.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal decision in Housing
Authority of Lake Charles v. Minor5 raises an issue of commer-
cial paper law in an area in which there is currently little cer-
tainty. A tenant transferred his paycheck by indorsement to his
lessor in (late) payment of rent due, and the lessor sought
eviction." It appears well-settled in Louisiana jurisprudence 37
33. There is no definition in the Commercial Laws of "collection" items or
"payment" or "cash" items. The term "item" itself is defined in LA. R.S. 10:4-
104(1)(g) (Supp. 1974) as "any instrument for the payment of money even though it
is not negotiable but does not include money." Banking usage provides working defini-
tions of "collection" 'and "cash" items. Typically, banks deal with checks as "cash"
items on the assumption that the overwhelming majority of them will be honored
("paid") by the drawee, and banks willingly give provisional credits immediately for
a check at all stages of the collection process. Such credits automatically become final
without further action when the drawee pays. See LA. R.S. 10:4-213(2) (Supp. 1974).
But not all items handled by banks carry the assumption, enjoyed by checks, that
payment will be virtually automatic; such items are handled as "collection" items and
the bank's function is viewed as a conduit for movement of the item in the bank
collection process. No credits-not even provisional-are usually given, and no funds
are usually advanced against collection items. Ultimately, the collection item reaches
the intended bank, which itself will present the item to-rather than pay it out of the
account of-the payor. Documentary drafts provide an example, as do instruments
payable "at" or "through" a named bank. See LA. R.S. 10:4-104(1)(f), 10:3-120, 10:3-
121 (Supp. 1974). See generally Farnsworth, Documentary Drafts Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 Bus. L. J. 479, 482-84 (1967); see also The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Commercial Paper, 34 LA. L. REv. 293, 296-
99 (1974).
34. The defendant-Board alleged, but failed to prove, that the bank had been
negligent in advancing funds on the warrant. Ordinary care is required of collecting
banks in various of their specific activities (see LA. R.S. 10:4-202 (Supp. 1974)) and in
the general handling of an item (see LA. R.S. 10:4-103(5) (Supp. 1974)), but it is
difficult to see how that duty would be owed to the drawer or to anyone other than
the collecting bank's own customer or transferor. See also Davis v. Miller Builders &
Dev'rs, Inc., 340 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Commercial Paper, 38 LA. L. REv. 384-90
(1978).
35. 355 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
36. The decision was in favor of the tenant, on equitable grounds. See U.C.C. §
1-103 (1972 revision).
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that the giving of a check is generally presumed to be intended
as conditional payment only, and that the underlying obliga-
tion (such as rent) is not discharged until the check is paid by
the drawee" or negotiated to another by the creditor." The
parties are presumed to understand and intend that the under-
lying obligation is in suspension and that the creditor can not
bring an action on that obligation until presentment is made
and the check is dishonored-in which case he may sue either
on the underlying obligation or on the check.4 Many NIL juris-
dictions entertained an exception to this presumed intent:
where a third-party's instrument is given by the debtor to the
creditor concurrently with the creation of the obligation, the
creditor-holder takes the instrument in unconditional payment
of the obligation," retaining rights only as to the instrument;
if he cannot collect it, he has no other rights on the obligation.
Thus, if the instrument is an unindorsed bearer instrument, or
indorsed "without recourse," or if the creditor-holder fails to
seasonably initiate collection proceedings on the check in-
dorsed by the debtor, he will have lost all rights against the
debtor. 2
It is unclear whether Louisiana jurisprudence has incorpo-
rated the "third-party instrument" exception; 3 likewise there
37. U.C.C. § 3-802, which would govern the effect of the instrument on the
underlying obligation, was not adopted in Louisiana, making the "other laws" lan-
guage in section 1-103 applicable.
38. See, e.g., Oxner v. Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 289 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 292 So. 2d 243 (La. 1974); Work Clothes Rental Service Co. v.
DuPont Mfrs., Inc., 262 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Seliga v. American Mutual
Liability Ins. Co., 174 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). The same is true with respect
to a draft. See Bank of Napoleonville v. Knobloch & Rainold, 144 La. 100, 80 So. 214
(1918).
39. Yarbrough v. Marks, 168 La. 57, 121 So. 301 (1929). The parties can, of
course, agree that the taking of an instrument is payment. See Abat v. Nolte, 6 Mart.
(N.S.) 636 (La. 1828).
40. LA. R.S. 10:3-413(2) (Supp. 1974).
41. U.C.C. § 3-802(li narrows this exception to cases in which the third-party is
a bank, i.e., a teller's check, cashier's check, or similar bank instrument. See generally
Rothschild, The Uniform Commercial Code's Undoing of an Obligation, 7 Bos. C.L.
REv. 63 (1965).
42. See LA. R.S. 10:3-503(2)(b) (Supp. 1974). A discharge on the instrument is a
pro tanto discharge of the underlying obligation. See also U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(b) (1972
revision).
43. Compare Waldrip Tire & Supply Co. v. Campbell Constr. Co., 158 So. 2d
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is a lack of clarity as to the effect on the underlying obligation
of a discharge on the instrument," at least to the extent a
novation" has not resulted.
464 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) (a contractor's check accepted by a supplier of materials
to a sub-contractor was said to have paid the sub-contractor's obligation) with Nielsen
v. Planter's Trust & Savings Bank of Opelousas, 164 So. 613 (La. 1935) (the Louisiana
Supreme Court ruled that "the indorsement and delivery of a check is not payment
but an order for payment." Id. at 615). The proposition in Nielsen is peculiar since
the indorsement of a check would, by definition, be the giving of a third-party's check,
which normally was held to be the equivalent of payment prior to the U.C.C.'s § 3-
802. What is more peculiar, the check in question was a cashier's check drawn by the
defendant bank on itself-the very type of instrument that U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(a) de-
scribes. See also Ocean Tow Boat Co. v. Ship Ophelia, 11 La. Ann. 28 (1856).
44. In the Minor case, for example, the landlord held the indorsed check from
May 9 to at least May 16, arguably a discharging circumstance. See note 42, supra.
45. The taking of a third-party's instrument has been held in a few cases to be a
novation under LA. Civ. CODE art. 2189, but the case law clearly indicates that a
novation is not easily proven by mere acts. The vendor's act of taking a third-party's
note, indorsed in blank by the payee, but not indorsed by the vendee, had the effect
of discharging the vendee pro tanto in Bates-Crumley Chevrolet Co. v. Brown, 141 So.
436 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932). The vendor had sued both the maker and the payee-
indorser and that fact contributed to the court's analysis of the vendor's intent regard-
ing novation (discharge). It is unclear how important to the decision was the fact that
the vendee (as a bearer of the note) was not required by the vendor to indorse the note.
The Bates-Crumley opinion, however, does discuss the difference between a check
and a promissory note:
A check . . . is merely the . . . means of delivery of the money. Whereas,
a note is a written engagement or promise to pay a certain sum of money at a
time specified. It is the evidence of an obligation to pay ....
When [vendees] delivered to (vendor] . . . the note, it was a giving of
the obligation of [maker], not theirs, unless they had indorsed the note.
Id. at 439. One can well take issue with the conclusion drawn by the court as to the
absence of a vendee's indorsement; one also has to doubt the significance of the distinc-
tion implicit in Bates-Crumley between the giving of a third-party's note and the
giving of a third-party's check, which also represents an engagement or obligation of
the issuing party. See LA. R.S. 10:3-413(2) (Supp. 1974); NIL § 61.
The case of Barron v. How, 2 Mart. (N.S.) 144 (La. 1824) also involved the
discharge of an obligation by acceptance of the note of a third-party.
